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Abstract
It has been proposed to realize secure communication using chaotic syn-
chronization via transmission of binary message encoded by parameter
modulation in the chaotic system. This paper considers the use of pa-
rameter adaptive control techniques to extract the message, based on
the assumptions that we know the equation form of the chaotic system
in the transmitter but do not have access to the precise values of the
parameters which are kept secret as a secure set. In the case that a syn-
chronizing system can be constructed using parameter adaptive control
by the transmitted signal and the synchronization is robust to parameter
mismatches, the parameter modulation can be revealed and the message
decoded without resorting to exact parameter values in the secure set. A
practical local Lyapunov function method for designing parameter adap-
tive control rules based on originally synchronized systems is presented.
PACS: 05.45.+b, 43.72+q
Key words: Communication, modulation, chaos, robust, parameter
adaptive control
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1 Introduction
Chaotic dynamics, which have noise-like broadband power spectra, are interesting candidates
for encoding and masking information signals in communication. Most approaches proposed
to realize this basic idea of using a chaotic signal as broadband carrier are based on the
synchronization of coupled chaotic systems [1]. Several schemes have been proposed so for:
(I) chaotic masking [2, 3] where the message is added directly to the chaotic carrier with an
amplitude much lower than the chaotic carrier; (II) chaotic modulation [4, 5, 6] where the
message is injected into the chaotic system to modulate the chaotic carrier, and (III) chaotic
switching [3, 7, 8] where a binary message is transmitted by switching between two chaotic
attractors associated with two sets of parameters of the system.
Intuitively, the communication is expected to be secure based on two considerations: (1)
it is difficult to read out the hidden message by any spectral analysis due to the broadband
nature of the chaotic carrier, and (2) exact knowledge of the parameters of the system in the
receiver is necessary to recover the message. Thus, a set of the system parameters which serve
as the encryption key, is not accessible by any third party.
However, recently some researchers have shown that the security may be spoiled, not by
access to the secure set of the parameters, but by some other approaches. For the commu-
nication schemes (I) and (II), it has been shown that the hidden message may be unmasked
with some nonlinear dynamical forecasting methods [9, 10]. It is believed that this weakness
in security is due to low dimension and single positive Lyapunov exponent of the chaotic
carrier, and the suggestion is to employ hyperchaotic systems, such as coupled chaotic ar-
rays [6, 11] or time-delay systems [12, 13] in communication. This however may not produce
drastic improvement in the security, as shown in a recent report [14] that messages masked
by hyperchaos of a six-dimensional system can be unmasked only with a three-dimensional
reconstruction, and in our recent work [15] demonstrating that messages masked by chaos of
time-delay systems with very hige dimension and many positive Lyapunov exponents can also
be extracted successfully.
Another work [16] has also shown that hidden messages can be extracted from chaotic
carrier without reconstructing the full dynamics, but using some suitable return maps, which
is successfully applied to the Lorenz system for communication schemes I and III.
The idea of encoding by parameter modulation is to use two chaotic attractors A and B
to represent the two symbols of the digital signals [3, 7, 8]. Since A 6= B, it is possible to
construct some suitable return maps which can distinguish the differences between the two
attractors, thus reading out the message, just as shown in Ref. [16]. However, if the two
attractors are rather complex or the differences between them are very subtle, it may be very
difficult to find such distinguishable return maps.
It is natural to ask if it is possible for a motivated intruder to follow the parameter
modulation in the transmitter using some parameter adaptive control by the transmitted
signal. This paper carrys out security analysis of communication systems using the encoding
scheme III. Our analysis is based on the following assumptions:
(a) The intruder does not have access to the precise value of any system parameters in the
secure set.
(b) The intruder does know the functional form of the chaotic system in the transmitter.
Our results will show that if a synchronizing system can be constructed using parameter
adaptive control by the transmitted signal and the synchronization is robust to parameter
mismatches, the messages may be decoded without resorting to the exact parameter values.
Since it is practically possible for a motivated intruder to locate a region close to the exact
parameters based on the knowledge of the system and the character of the transmitted signal,
the security may be spoiled. Robustness of the synchronization to parameter mismatches is
an advantage for implementation of the communication scheme but may be a weakness to the
security.
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2 Decoding by parameter adaptive control
Let us consider the following transmitter system
dx
dt
= F(p,q,x), (1)
where p and q are system parameters. Binary messages are encoded by switching q between
q1 and q2. Based on our assumption, a motivated intruder has known the equations of the
system and that q are modulated for encoding. He tries to construct a decoding system using
parameter adaptive control by the transmitted signal s = h(x), as
dy
dt
= H(py,qy,y, s), (2)
dqy
dt
= G(y,qy, s)(s− h(y)), (3)
Suppose that this system (called as the intruder system from now on) is synchronizable with
some suitable coupling function G if py = p.
In general, it is not always possible that one can find a synchronizable intruder system for
any transmitted signal s and any subset q of the system parameters. However, if with this
transmitted signal s, a synchronizable system H(p,q,y, s) can be found by some synchroniza-
tion schemes, such as Pecora-Carroll decomposition [1], active-passive decomposition [4] or
feedback control [17] without parameter adaptive control, then we can expect that additional
parameter adaptive control loops for parameters qy exist if the synchronization is robust to
parameter mismatches to some extent, because the system H driven by s is still stable (the
largest conditional Lyapunov exponent is negative) for parameters qy in the vicinity of the
point qy = q although exact synchronization is spoiled by parameter mismatches, and the
exact synchronization can be restored by bringing the parameters back to the point qy = q
using some appropriate control methods. For some systems, such parameter control rules can
be found by an analysis based on a global Lyapunov function. In general however, such an
analytical treatment may not be possible. In this case, we employ the idea of designing control
rule using the information of a control surface [18] constructed by perturbing the parameters
qy. The essence of the idea is that since the synchronization between the systems H and
F before incorporating parameter adaptive control is robust to parameter mismatches, the
synchronization behavior changes smoothly when qy deviate slightly from q. And there exists
a local Lyapunove function with respect to the parameters qy near q, with the form
E(qy) = U
TU (4)
where U = (U1, U2, · · · , Uk)
T are time average of some functions u = (u1, u2, · · · , uk)
T (k is
the number of the components in qy), i.e.,
Ui = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
uidt (i = 1, 2, · · · , k). (5)
The function ui has the form ui = uˆi(s,y,qy)(s − h(y)) so that U = 0 if qy = q. In order
that E(qy) is a local Lyapunov function, it is required that U is smooth with respect to qy
near q. With this local Lyapunov function, the following evolution system
dU
dt
= −αU, (6)
is stable at U = 0. α is a convergence parameter. Noting that the convergence of U is
induced by control of the parameters, we have
dqy
dt
=
∂qy
∂U
dU
dt
= −α
∂qy
∂U
U. (7)
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In general, it is impossible to obtain an explicit form of U for the control rule in Eq. (7).
To solve this problem, we use a control surface obtained in simulation or experiment. First
we record a time series s from system F(p,q,x) with a known set of parameter (p,q) in
the chaotic regime. Then we perturb the parameter qy in the driven system H(p,qy,y, s)
slightly from q to some values in its vicinity, and compute U(qy) as a function of qy. For
appropriately chosen function u, U(qy) are smooth with respect to qy close to the point q,
and in the vivinity, it can be approximated by
U(qy) =M(qy − q), (8)
where the constant k × k matrix M is obtained by a local linear fitting of the numerically or
experimentally obtained control surface U(qy). Now if the initial value of qy is close to q, we
can replace the Jacobian matrix ∂qy/∂U in Eq. (7) by the matrix M
−1, i.e.
dqy
dt
= −αM−1U. (9)
In practice, one can implement the above control rule by replacing U with a time average
over a period of time τ , e.g.
Ui(t) =
1
τ
∫ t
t−τ
uidt. (10)
Often, the parameter modulation in the transmitter is much slower than the time scale of the
chaotic system, and one can simplify the control rule by replacing the time average Ui with
ui, and finally obtains
dqy
dt
= −αM−1u. (11)
We can expect that with the above additional parameter adaptive control, the synchro-
nization between the systems is maintained with small enough coupling strength α for qy
initially close to q, so that the parameters q can be recoved. We can also expect that the
synchronization is also robust to mismatches of the rest parameters p. The function ui can
be chosen somewhat arbitrarily, as long as Ui (and thus E(qy)) is a smooth function of qy in
the neighborhood of q. This scheme provides a general and practical yet simple way to build
additional parameter adaptive control loops for originally coupled and synchronized systems,
even though a proper choice of the functions ui may still be nontrivial. In this way, the
intruder can design systematically an attacking system for the communication scheme based
on the knowledge of the system, although so designed control scheme using local information
may not be successful when applied to the signal from the transmitter whose parameters the
intruder does not know, especially when the transmitter is operating in a parameter region
far way from that the intruder uses to build the control rule. However, it is possible for
the intruder to get into a neighborhood of the transmitter parameters using some system
identification methods based on the knowledge of the system.
Since the intruder system is quite robust to parameter mismatches, the parameter modu-
lation in the transmitter may be revealed and the message decoded without resorting to the
exact values of the transmitter parameters p, but within some tolerable neighborhood. In
certain cases, it might also be possible to recover all the transmitter parameters (p,q) by
designing adaptive control loops for all of them with the above scheme.
In the next sections, we present examples of message decoding based on the above idea.
In the first example of Chua’s circuit, the control rule is obtained with a global function
analysis and in the second example of Lorenz system, the control rule is designed with the
local Lyapunov function scheme.
3 An example of Chua’s circuit
As an illustration, we carry out analysis on a specific communication system proposed in
Ref. [8]. We first give a brief description of the encoding scheme, and then construct a robust
intruder system.
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3.1 The transmitter
The communication system employs the well-known Chua’s circuit as the chaotic system. The
evolution equations for the Chua’s circuit are given by
C1
dx1
dt
=
1
R
(x2 − x1)− h(x1), (12)
C2
dx2
dt
=
1
R
(x1 − x2) + x3, (13)
L
dx3
dt
= −x2. (14)
The nonlinear characteristic of the Chua’s diode h(x1) is given by
h(x1) = G1x1 +
1
2
(G0 −G1)[|x1 +Bp| − |x1 −Bp|], (15)
which is a three-segment piecewise-linear function.
A binary message stream Iin is encoded by switching between parameters G0 , G1 and
G′
0
= G0 +
1
r
, G′
1
= G1 +
1
r
when the stream switches between +1 and −1, where r is a
resistor in parallel with Chua’s diode. The parameters used are shown in Table I. Since 1/r
is small (about 1% with respect to G0 and G1), the two chaotic attractors are very similar, as
shown in Fig. 1. To examine the similarity, we construct return maps using the consecutive
maxima xmax(n) and xmax(n + 1) from the transmitter signal x1, as done in Ref. [16]. The
results are shown in Fig. 2, with circles for Iin = 1 and crosses for Iin = −1 respectively. It
is seen that the maps are quite complicated, and most of the points of the two maps coincide
and entangle with each other. Distinguishable difference between the two maps is only seen
for xmax(n) around −0.5, which consists of only a small fraction of the maxima. Extracting
the message, although is not totally impossible, can be done only for a small portion of the
message bits.
3.2 The intruder system
Based on our assumption, the intruder does know that the chaotic system of the transmitter
is the Chua’s circuit and that the message is encoded by the modulation of G0 and G1, but
does not know the value of any of the parameters C1, C2, R, L,Bp, G0, G1, r. Based on the
available information, the intruder constructs a receiver system based on the idea of parameter
adaptive control as follows:
C1
dy1
dt
=
1
R
(y2 − y1)− h(x1), (16)
C2
dy2
dt
=
1
R
(y1 − y2) + y3, (17)
L
dy3
dt
= −y2, (18)
dQ0
dt
=
1
2
x1[y1 − x1][1− sgn(|x1| −Bp)], (19)
dQ1
dt
=
1
2
x1[y1 − x1][1 + sgn(|x1| − Bp)]. (20)
where Q0 and Q1 are controllable parameters of h(x1) which is now
h(x1) = Q1x1 +
1
2
(Q0 −Q1)[|x1 +Bp| − |x1 − Bp|]. (21)
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Eqs. (19-20) mean that Q0 is modified when |x1| ≤ Bp and Q1 is modified when |x1| > Bp.
The intruder system of Eqs. (16-21) will synchronize with the transmitter Eqs. (12-15) if
the parameters C1, C2, R, L,Bp are identical for the two systems. To prove it, let us examine
the dynamics of the difference ei = yi − xi(i = 1, 2, 3), e4 = Q0 −G0 and e5 = Q1 −G1 given
by
C1
de1
dt
=
1
R
(e2 − e1)−
1
2
x1e4[1− sgn(|x1| −Bp)]−
1
2
x1e5[1 + sgn(|x1| − Bp)], (22)
C2
de2
dt
=
1
R
(e1 − e2) + e3, (23)
L
de3
dt
= −e2, (24)
de4
dt
=
1
2
x1e1[1− sgn(|x1| − Bp)], (25)
de5
dt
=
1
2
x1e1[1 + sgn(|x1| − Bp)]. (26)
The global Lyapunov function
E = C1e
2
1
+ C2e
2
2
+ Le2
3
+ e2
4
+ e2
5
, (27)
dE
dt
= −
2
R
(e2
1
+ e2
2
) ≤ 0, (28)
suggests that the state and parameters of the intruder system will converge to those of the
transmitter. Fig. 3 illustrates the synchronization process of the system with the attractor
in Fig. 1(a) (Iin = 1). The synchronization error decreases exponentially with time, with
fluctuations only within small time scales, and we can expect that the synchronization is
robust to parameter mismatches. Note that the stable values Q0 = −0.753 and Q1 = −0.396
are just the values of G0 and G1 in the transmitter.
When the information stream enters the transmitter, lasting a time interval T for each
bit, the transmitted signal is a sequence switching between the two chaotic attractors in Fig.
1. We take T = 4.65 ms as in Ref. [8]. With the transmitted signal s = x1 (Fig. 4(a))
carrying a random message stream, the intruder observed the change of parameter Q0 and
Q1 in Fig. 4(b) and (c) respectively. Switching between the two chaotic attractors results in
only small fluctuations of Q0, but sudden jumps of Q1, because |x1| > Bp most of the time so
that Q1 is modified more frequently. After a transient of about 50 ms, Q1 comes to oscillate
slightly about −0.395 for bit +1 and −0.385 for bit −1. A comparison between the evolution
of Q1 and the parameter modulation in the transmitter shows clearly that the message can be
decoded correctly except for a few bits during the synchronization transient. An interesting
thing is that, since T is much smaller than the relaxation time of synchronization (about
50 ms, see Fig. 3), the intruder operates in a regime of synchronization transient after the
message stream switches from one value to the other. As a result, the oscillation amplitude of
Q1 (about 10 µs) is larger than the parameter modulation
1
r
= 6µs in the transmitter, which
can be an advantage for message decoding.
So far, we use the exact values of the transmitter parameters C1, C2, R, L,Bp in the intruder
system to demonstrate that it is able to follow the parameter modulation in the transmitter by
adaptive control. By assumption, the intruder does not have access to these values. However,
it is possible to locate an approximate region in the parameter space using some characteristic
quantities for system identification based on the knowledge of the chaotic system and at the
same time monitor the synchronization error during the scanning of the parameter space.
In the following simulation, we suppose that the intruder is able to locate a region within
20% deviation from the precise values of the parameters. We choose 5 random values in
[−0.2, 0.2] as the relative difference of the above parameters between the intruder and the
transmitter, as displayed in table II as an example. For the same information stream in Fig.
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4(c), the evolution of Q1 is now presented in Fig. 5(a) which is shifted to oscillate quite
noisely around −0.36 due to the parameter mismatches. After smoothing the fluctuations
with a moving average filter with length of 4 ms, the oscillation of Q1 reveals most of the
parameter modulation in the transmitter correctly, as seen in Fig. 5(b). We use a simple
threshold testing to recover the message, as shown in Fig. 5(c) with a threshold Qth = −0.365.
A comparison between the recovered and the original messages has clearly shown that the
security is compromised. The results are also robust to external noise, as seen in Fig. 6 for
the same parameters as in Fig. 5, but with x1 containing noise between [−0.2, 0.2].
4 An example of Lorenz system
In the above example, we are able to write down the parameter adaptive control rules based on
an analytical treatment by a global Lyapunov function. In the following example, we revisit
the communication system in Refs. [3, 16] to illustrate the idea of designing an intruder
system using the above local Lyapunov function method, although it has been shown that
the message can be extracted using some suitable return maps [16].
The communication system using Lorenz system is
dx1
dτ
= σ(x2 − x1), (29)
dx2
dτ
= rx1 − x2 − x1x3, (30)
dx3
dτ
= x1x2 − bx3, (31)
where σ = 16.0, r = 45.6 and b is modulated between b = 4.0 and b = 4.4. s = x1 is the
transmitted signal.
We can design an attacking system with parameter adaptive control for parameter b based
on the following system coupled by feedback [17],
dy1
dτ
= σ(y2 − y1) + ǫ(s− y1), (32)
dy2
dτ
= ry1 − y2 − y1y3, (33)
dy3
dτ
= y1y2 − by3, (34)
which will be synchronized with the system x for large enough coupling strength ǫ. The
synchronization is also quite robust to parameter mismatches for large ǫ. Since by assumption,
we do not know the parameter values in the transmitter, we uses (σ, r, b) = (10, 28, 8/3) from
a chaotic region in experiment or simulation. With ǫ = 40, for example, the two system is
synchronized. Now let systems x and y have the same σ and r, but perturb the parameter
b in the system y around b = 8/3, e.g. by = b(1 + ∆). We calculate U(∆) as a function
of ∆ by trying the following three simplest functions u1 = (s − y1)y1, u2 = (s − y1)y2 and
u3 = (s− y1)y3 . The results of U are shown in Fig. 7. It is seen that U is a smooth function
for ∆ close to zero for the functions u1 and u2, but not for u3. And it is obvious that U
is also a smooth function for any linear combination of u1 and u2. Some other choices of u
is possible, for example u = (s − y1)y1y3. Now we can introduce the additional parameter
control loop
db
dτ
= αu, (35)
where u can be u1, u2 or their any linear combinations or many other possible choices. The sign
of α is determined by the sign of dU/d∆. Simulations have demonstrated that so designed con-
trol rules maintain the synchronization for α small enough. α is allowed to be larger for larger
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ǫ. The control is still stable if the system parameters are shifted from (σ, r, b) = (10, 28, 8/3)
to those of the transmitter, and the initial values of the parameter b in the system y does
not need to be close to that of the system x. Since our purpose is to illustrate the designing
idea, we do not go into great details on the synchronization behavior in the parameter space
(ǫ, α). The fact is, in a large region of this parameter space, the synchronization is very robust
to mismatches of the rest parameters σ and r. An example of the synchronization without
and with the additional parameter control loop is shown in Fig. 8 for u = u1 = (s − y1)y1,
(σ, r, b) = (16.0, 45.6, 4.0) and (ǫ, α) = (40, 0.1). The synchronization is a little slower when
parameter adaptive control is introduced, and it is robust to parameter mismatches because
the synchronization error decreases exponentially, with fluctuations only within very small
time scales. The parameter b comes very close to b = 4.0 in the transmitter from a large
initial value b = 17.0 within only a few ms (in the new time scale below).
Now let us use the system to attack the secure communication. In order that the time
scale agrees with the system in [3, 16], we introduce a new time scale t = τ/K where K =
2505 [16] is a scale factor. In the transmitter, the bit duration is 4 ms. As in the above
section, we first demonstrate the parameter recovery for identical parameters σ and r in the
transmitter and intruder systems, as seen in Fig. 9. Then, we examine the robustness to the
parameter mismatches of σ and r. The message can be recoved quite reliablely if (σy, ry) in
the intruder system is within a relatively close neighborhood of the transmitter, say, within
a 20% deviation. Message decoding is generally extremely robust for σy < σ and ry > r.
An example for σy = 0.37σ and ry = 1.72r is shown in Fig. 10. It is seen that b has been
made to oscillate around b = 2.2 rather than b = 4.2 in the transmitter due to very large
parameter mismatches, however, the message is recoved correctly with a moving average filter
with length of 2 ms and a simple threshold test.
In the following, we go further to design adaptive control loops for all the three parameters
(σ, r, b) in the Lorenz system. We find that U changes smoothly when the parameters in the
originally synchronized systems change slightly if we choose the following three functions
u1 = (s− y1)y1y3, u2 = (s− y1)y2, u3 = (s− y1)(y1 + y2) (36)
The control surface is obtained by perturbing the parameters in the driven system within a
2% vicinity of (σ, r, b) = (10, 28, 8/3). Ui(i = 1, 2, 3) is the time average of ui in a period of
0.1 second in the time scale t. After evaluating the matrix M−1, we obtained the following
attacking system with parameter adaptive control loops:
dy1
dτ
= σ(y2 − y1) + ǫ(s− y1), (37)
dy2
dτ
= ry1 − y2 − y1y3, (38)
dy3
dτ
= y1y2 − by3, (39)
dσ
dτ
= α(−0.293u1 − 18.5u2 + 15.7u3), (40)
dr
dτ
= α(1.18u1 + 95.4u2 − 75.4u3), (41)
db
dτ
= α(−0.123u1 − 10.2u2 + 8.10u3). (42)
This system is synchronized for small enough α even if the parameters has been shifted to
those in the transmitter, i.e. (σ, r, b) = (16.0, 45.6, 4.0). An example of the synchronization
and parameter recovery process is shown in Fig. 11 for (ǫ, α) = (100, 0.2). The convergence
rate with the additional parameter adaptive control is slower than that without these control
loops. Now if the bit duration in the transmitter is longer than the synchronization transient,
the attacking system can follow the parameter modulation in the transmitter and thus decode
the message. An example is shown in Fig. 12, where the bit duration is 16 ms. While the
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parameter b clearly follows the modulation, the other two parameters also reflect the switch of
the message from one value to the other. It is seen again in Fig. 11 that the synchronization
error decreases exponentially, with fluctuations only within very small time scale, so that the
message decoding is also very robust to channel noise. Fig. 13 shows the recoved parameters
when the transmitted signal s = x1 contains an additive noise in [−1, 1].
5 Discussion
Based on the assumption that the chaotic system structure is in the public domain and the
system parameters are kept in secret as the encryption key in a secure communication system
encoding digital message by parameter modulation, we have shown how an intruder might
decode the message using an appropriate attacking system with parameter adaptive control by
the transmitted signal, even though the intruder does not have access to the exact parameter
values in the transmitter. A requirement for the success of this attacking approach is that the
intruder can design a synchronizing parameter adaptive control system which is quite robust
to mismatches between the parameters of the two systems, so that the message can be recoved
without resorting to the exact parameters in the transmitter, but within some neighborhood.
Based on the knowledge of the system, it is practically possible for the intruder to get into
such a neighborhood using some system identification methods.
For some systems, such a robust synchronizing intruder system with parameter adaptive
control can be constructed based on an analysis of a global Laypunov function. Generally,
such an analytical treatment is impossible, and we proposed a quite general and practical lo-
cal Lyapunov function method to design parameter adaptive control rules based on a system
which has been synchronized by the transmitted signal. Such a synchronizing system is often
obtainable using many possible approaches for constructing synchronization chaotic systems,
such as Pecora-Carroll decomposition, active-passive decomposition or feed-back control. In
many systems, the synchronization is robust to parameter mismatches if the coupling is not
close to the synchronization threshold. The parameter control rules are designed by seeking
appropriate functions of the synchronization error whose time average change smoothly when
the parameters in the originally synchronized systems deviate slightly from each other. The
smooth control surface is obtained in simulation or experiment by perturbing the parameters
that will be involved in adaptive control. Although this scheme is quite general, in practice,
finding a set of appropriate functions may not be a trivial task when many parameters are
involved in modulation. In some cases, the originally synchronized system may be very sensi-
tive to parameter mismatches due to unstable invariant sets embedded in the synchronization
manifold [19, 20], and the proposed local Lyapunov function may not be successful in design-
ing additional parameter adaptive control loops for such systems. However, such systems will
not be used in the communication systems because the authorized receiver cannot decode the
message correctly in practical environment with unavoidable perturbations.
Employing some system identification methods, the intruder may be able to identify a
region near the transmitter parameters in the parameter space in order to design a stable
intruder system. Furthermore, the intruder may be able to get close enough to the transmitter
parameters by monitoring the synchronization error while scanning the parameter space, so
that the message can be decoded with very low rate of errors. During the decoding process,
the intruder can improve the decoding by comparison of the results using different parameters
in the identified region. In some systems, it is also possible to design adaptive control loops
for all the system parameters, so that the message can be decoded even more reliablely.
Based on our investigation, we would like to point out an interesting paradox between
robustness and security in chaotic communications. Since in practice, parameter mismatches
and external noise is unavoidable, we would require the synchronization systems to be ro-
bust to these perturbations, so that high-quality synchronization can be established between
the transmitter and the authorized receiver to recover the message correctly in practical im-
plementation. On the other hand, this robustness may be employed by a third party to
compromise the security. How to improve the security while maintaining the robustness is an
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interesting and meaningful research topic for chaotic communications.
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Table I. Values of the parameters of the Chua’s circuit in the transmitter.
C1 (nF) C2 (nF) R (Ω) L (mH) G0 (ms) G1 (ms) 1/r (µs) Bp (V)
10 100 1680 18 −0.753 −0.396 6 1
Table II. Parameters of the transmitter and the intruder and their relative differences.
transmitter C1 C2 R L Bp
intruder 0.817C1 1.163C2 1.072R 0.897L 0.849Bp
differences (%) −18.3 16.3 7.2 −10.3 15.1
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Figure Captions
Fig. 1. Two attractors used to encode binary information, with (a) corresponding to bit +1
and (b) to −1.
Fig. 2. Return maps of the consecutive maxima of the transmitted signal x1. Most of the
points for the attractor in Fig. 2(a) (circles) and those for the attractor in Fig. 2(b)
(crosses) do not have distinguishable separation.
Fig. 3. Synchronization process of the intruder to the attractor in Fig. 2(a)
(a) Synchronization error
√∑
e2i . (b) Convergence of parameters Q0 and Q1 to those of
the transmitter G0 = −0.753 and G1 = −0.396, respectively. In all the figures in this
paper, the unit of time is ms.
Fig. 4. The process of following the parameter modulation in the transmitter.
(a) The transmitted signal s = x1. (b) Change of Q0. (c) Change of Q1. The dotted
line shows the parameter modulation in the transmitter.
Fig. 5. An example of decoding process.
(a) Evolution of Q1. It oscillates noisely due to quite large parameter mismatches.
(b) Smoothed Q1 by moving average with length of 4 ms. The dotted line shows the
parameter modulation in the transmitter. (c) The decoded message by threshold testing
with a threshold Qth = −0.365. (d) The original message stream.
Fig. 6. Analogous to Fig. 6, but with s containing noise between [−0.2, 0.2].
Fig. 7. U as a function of the relative deviation of the parameter b for different choice of
function u. The smooth functions can be used to design parameter adaptive control
loop.
Fig. 8. Synchronization and parameter recovery with the additional parameter adaptive
control loop of Eq. (35). (a) and (b) are synchronization errors without and with this
control loop respectively. (c) is the convergence of the parameter b.
Fig. 9. The process of following the parameter modulation in the case that the rest of the
parameters σ and r are identical.
Fig. 10. Illustration of message decoding when the parameters σ and r have large mismatches
between the systems. (a) Evolution of b. (b) smoothed b by moving average filter with
length of 2ms. (c) The decoded message by threshold testing with a threshold bth = 2.2.
(d) The original message stream.
Fig. 11. Synchronization and parameter recovery with the additional parameter adaptive
control loops for all the three parameters. (a) Plots 1 and 2 are synchronization errors
without and with these control loops respectively. (b), (c) and (d) are the evolutions of
the parameters σ, r and b, respectively.
Fig. 12. The process of following the parameter modulation in the transmitter. (a) is an
input message stream. (b), (c) and (d) are the evolutions of the parameters σ, r and b,
respectively. The bit duration is 16 ms.
Fig. 13. Robustness of the message decoding in the presence of channel noise within [−1, 1].
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